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TWO DADS ARE BETTER THAN ONE: THE SUPREME 
COURT OF VIRGINIA'S DECISION IN L.F. V. BREIT 
AND WHY VIRGINIA'S ASSISTED CONCEPTION 
STATUTE SHOULD ALLOW GAY COUPLES TO 
LEGALLY PARENT A CHILD TOGETHER 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In May 2012, Roanoke Athletic Club in Virginia revoked a fam-
ily club membership from two dads and their two-year-old son Ol-
iver, after discovering that the two dads were gay and that they 
did not qualify for club membership. 1 William Trinkle, Juan Gra-
nados, and Oliver applied for membership at the athletic club so 
that they could enjoy the summer by the pool as a family. 2 Trinkle 
purchased a family membership and club officials approved his 
application, but soon after the family started using the facilities, 
the operations director contacted the couple. 3 The director re-
voked their membership because they did not qualify under the 
club's definition of a family. 4 Thus, Trinkle, Granados, and Oliver 
were denied a family membership simply because of Trinkle's and 
Granados' sexual orientations. In addition, Oliver was denied the 
access available to children of heterosexual couples. 5 Although the 
athletic club later changed its definition of a family to allow fami-
lies like Trinkle, Granados, and Oliver to gain membership, this 
event highlights one of the many problems gay dads face in Vir-
ginia as a result of the current state of Virginia law regarding le-
gal parentage.6 Virginia law essentially prohibits two gay dads, 
1. Virginia Fitness Club to Allow Gay Parents to Join After Lawsuit, FoxNEWS.COM 
(July 5, 2012), http:/lwww.foxnews.com/us/2012/07/05/virginia-fitness-club-to-allow-gay-
parents-to-join-after-lawsuit/. 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id.; Charlene Gomes, Partners as Parents: Challenges Faced by Gays Denied Mar-
riage, 63 HUMANIST 14, 14-15 (2003). 
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such as Trinkle and Granados, from both establishing legal rights 
over their children. 7 
As of 2012, there were more than 110,000 same-sex couples in 
the United States raising children.8 One way same-sex couples 
become parents is through assisted reproductive technology 
("ART'').9 ART includes all fertility treatments in which both the 
egg and the sperm are manipulated. 10 Typically, ART involves 
removing eggs from a woman's ovaries, combining the ovaries 
with sperm in a laboratory, and placing the eggs in a woman's 
body. 11 ART allows gay couples to create a family through gesta-
tional surrogacy. Gestational surrogacy is a treatment process 
where a woman, designated as the surrogate, carries to term a 
fertilized egg not genetically related to her. 12 One of the men in a 
same-sex couple may choose to donate his own sperm, thus allow-
ing one partner to have a genetic connection to the child. 13 Before 
initiating any gestational surrogacy treatment, the surrogate and 
the intended parents typically form a surrogacy contract. A sur-
rogacy contract usually requires the surrogate to surrender any 
legal rights to the child once the child is born. 14 Although gesta-
tional surrogacy allows two gay men hoping for a child to take 
part in the creation of a child, and a surrogacy contract has the 
potential to terminate the legal parental rights of the surrogate, 
7. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (2008); id. § 63.2-1225 (2012) (limiting adoption to mar-
ried couples and unmarried individuals). 
8. Press Release, Williams Inst., As Overall Percentage of Same-Sex Couples Raising 
Children Declines, Those Adopting Almost Doubles-Significant Diversity Among Lesbian 
and Gay Families (Jan. 25, 2012), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/press/ 
press-releases/as-overall-percentage-of-same-sex-couples-raising-children-declines-those-
adopting-almost-doubles-significant-diversity-among-lesbian-and-gay-families/. 
9. Tiffany L. Palmer, The Winding Road to the Two-Dad Family: Issues Arising in 
Interstate Surrogacy for Gay Couples, 8 RUTGERS J.L. & PuB. POL 'v 895, 895 (2011). 
10. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, 2005 AsSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES: NATIONAL 
SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS 3 (2007), available at http://www.cdc.gov/art/ 
ART2005/508PDF/2005ART508.pdf. 
11. Id. This specific technique is called in vitro fertilization. Id. 
12. Dominique Ladomato, Note, Protecting Traditional Surrogacy Contracting 
Through Fee Payment Regulation, 23 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 245, 247 (2012). 
13. See id. at 247-48; Palmer, supra note 9 at 896; Diane S. Hinson, Is the VA Su-
preme Court Mouing to the Left? VA Supreme Court Recognizes Paternity Rights of an Un-
married Father, CREATIVE FAMILY CONNECTIONS (Jan. 11, 2013), http://surrogacyguru 
blog.com/post/40403688876/is-the-va-supreme-court-moving-to-the-left-va-supreme. 
14. Ladomato, supra note 12 at 249 (citing Sample TS Contract, ALL ABOUT 
SURROGACY, http://www.allaboutsurrogacy.com/sample_contracts/TScontract.htm (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2014)). 
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legal problems still arise when attempting to establish parentage 
of the two dads. 
Gestational surrogacy allows gay men to have a child with the 
help of a surrogate and an egg donor, but it does not come with-
out legal, ethical, and social implications. One important question 
that must be addressed is who the child's legal parents are.15 Vir-
ginia, along with many other states, has passed statutes regulat-
ing the legal status of children conceived through ARTs in an ef-
fort to address the legal questions arising from this new form of 
reproductive technology. 16 These Virginia statutes prohibit both 
gay men from establishing legal parentage. 
Specifically, Virginia Code section 20-156 limits the enforcea-
bility of surrogacy contracts based on the marital status of the in-
tended parents. 17 The statute defines a surrogacy contract as "an 
agreement between intended parents, a surrogate, and her hus-
band, if any."18 The code further defines intended parents as "a 
man and a woman, married to each other."19 These definitions 
preclude homosexual couples from entering into a binding surro-
gacy contract thus inhibiting them from establishing legal 
parenthood through ART.20 Despite the hurdle that section 20-156 
creates for homosexual couples on their path to parenthood 
through surrogacy contracts, the Supreme Court of Virginia's de-
cision in L.F. u. Breit offers hope that homosexual couples will 
have success in establishing legal parentage in Virginia. 
In January 2013, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that an 
unmarried paternal donor for in vitro fertilization had parental 
rights over the resulting child in L.F. u. Breit.21 The court rea-
soned that Virginia's marital preference in surrogacy contracts 
resulting from assisted conception is designed to protect "an in-
tact family from the intervention from third-party strangers"-
15. Anne R. Dana, Note, The State of Surrogacy Laws: Determining Legal Parentage 
for Gay Fathers, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL 'y 353, 354 (2011). 
16. See VA. CODE ANN.§ 20-156 to -165 (2008 & Cum. Supp. 2013). 
17. Id. § 20-156 (2008); Brooke D. Rodgers-Miller, Adam and Steve and Eve: Why Sex-
uality Segregation in Assisted Reproduction in Virginia Is No Longer Acceptable, 11 WM. & 
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 293, 293 (2005). 
18. VA. CODE.ANN.§ 20-156 (2008). 
19. Id. 
20. See Rodgers-Miller, supra note 17, at 293. 
21. 736 S.E.2d 711, 722 (Va. 2013). 
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not to deprive a child of "a responsible, involved parent."22 As a 
result of the Breit decision, the Virginia General Assembly passed 
Virginia Code section 1-240.1. Section 1-240.1 states that "a par-
ent has a fundamental right to make decisions concerning the 
upbringing, education, and care of the parent's child."23 The hold-
ing in Breit and Virginia Code section 1-240.1 should open the 
door for same-sex couples, in particular gay male couples who are 
more vulnerable under the law, to contract surrogacy agreements 
allowing them to assert parental rights.24 
This comment examines whether gay men can have a child 
through a surrogacy arrangement in Virginia and whether gay 
men can retain parental rights through surrogacy contracts un-
der the Virginia Assisted Conception Act. The Virginia laws affect 
gay males and gay females equally, but this comment addresses 
the issues arising with same-sex couples in the context of gay 
dads. Part II provides a background of surrogacy and specifically 
discusses surrogacy in relation to same-sex couples. Part III pro-
vides a general background of adoption and the establishment of 
parentage rights. Part IV describes the Assisted Conception Act, 
the legislative history of the Act, and its consequences on gay 
men. Part V discusses the January 2013 Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia decision, L.F. v. Breit. Part VI discusses how the holding in 
Breit and Virginia Code section 1-240.1 can and should be applied 
to homosexual couples in order to protect their fundamental con-
stitutional rights. Part VII recommends that to protect these 
rights, Virginia should amend its definition of "intended parents" 
in Virginia Code section 20-156 to include gay parents and to al-
low for second-parent adoption. 
II. ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY AND SURROGACY 
ARTs provide individuals and couples opportunities to create a 
child that they would not otherwise be able to create. There are 
two types of infertility that lead people to use ARTs-functional 
22. Id. at 723. 
23. VA. CODE ANN.§ 1-240.l (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
24. Gay male couples are more vulnerable under the law than lesbian couples because 
gay men do not adopt the traditional gender roles for parents. Palmer, supra note 9, at 
899. Gay couples become the caretakers of a child and that is a role traditionally held by 
women. Id. (citing Marla J. Hollandsworth, Gay Men Creating Families Through Surro-
Gay Arrangements: A Paradigm for Reproductive Freedom, 3 AM. U.J. GENDER & L. 183, 
192 (1995)). 
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infertility and structural infertility.25 Functional infertility occurs 
when a man or woman cannot reproduce for a medical reason 
such as age, endometrial polyps, pelvic infection, or not being able 
to carry a baby to term in women, and semen abnormalities in 
men. 26 Structural infertility is not the result of a medical condi-
tion, but instead occurs when an individual needs a person of the 
opposite sex's biological assistance to reproduce. 21 Structural in-
fertility affects all gay couples looking to reproduce.28 
ARTs are a solution to both structural and functional infertili-
ty. ARTs "started out as an effort to help married couples fulfill 
their dreams of having genetically related children [but] has, 
within just a few short years, triggered a revolution about how we 
think about parentage, marriage, and even gender identifica-
tion."29 ARTs come in many forms, but they include all fertility 
procedures where both the egg and the sperm are handled outside 
of the body.30 The most popular form of ART is in vitro fertiliza-
tion. This is when eggs are removed from an ovary and combined 
with sperm in a petri dish.31 After the embryo is created, it is im-
planted in a woman's uterus. 32 Artificial insemination33 and sur-
rogacy, although not technically ART because manipulation of the 
eggs and sperm outside the body is not required, are generally 
grouped with ARTs. 34 Surrogacy is particularly associated with 
25. Dana, supra note 15, at 359. 
26. See id. (citing Margarete Sandelowski & Sheryl de Lacey, The Uses of a "Disease''.· 
Infertility as Rhetorical Vehicle, in INFERTILITY AROUND THE GLOBE: NEW THINKING ON 
CHILDLESSNESS, GENDER, AND REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 33, 35 (Martin C. Inborn & 
Frank van Balen eds., 2002); Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisi-
ble Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 23-24 (2008)); Infer-
tility: Symptoms, Treatment, Diagnosis, UCLA HEALTH, http://obgyn.ucla.edu/body.cfm? 
id=326 (last visited Apr. 14, 2014). 
27. Dana, supra note 15, at 359. 
28. Id. 
29. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 1063 (2d ed. 2009) (quot-
ing Bruce Lord Wilder, Current Status of Assisted Reproduction Technology 2005: An 
Overview and Glance at the Future, 39 FAM. L.Q. 573, 573 (2005)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
30. Dana, supra note 15, at 360. 
31. Bridget M. Fuselier, The Trouble With Putting All of Your Eggs in One Basket: 
Using a Property Rights Model to Resolve Disputes Over Cryopreserved Pre-Embryos, 14 
TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 143, 144 (2009). 
32. Id. 
33. Artificial insemination means sperm is injected into the female by some unnatural 
means. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 128-29 (9th ed. 2009). 
34. Dana, supra note 15, at 360 (citing JESSICA ARONS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, 
FUTURE CHOICES: ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 5 (2007), availa-
ble at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/12pdf/arond-art.pdf). 
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ARTs since it utilizes artificial insemination or in vitro fertiliza-
tion in order to fulfill the pregnancy.35 
Surrogacy is a means of "curing'' structural infertility for gay 
men, single men, and also some straight couples. 36 A woman, the 
surrogate, agrees to carry the fetus in her womb and give birth to 
a child that she does not plan on raising as her own. 37 After the 
birth, the woman gives the child to the intended parents-the 
single man, the same-sex couple, or the heterosexual couple who 
contracted with the surrogate. 38 
There are two options for surrogacy: gestational or traditional.39 
Traditional surrogacy is when the surrogate agrees to be the egg 
donor and the carrier of the child.4° For male gay couples, one of 
the intended fathers can donate the sperm to artificially insemi-
nate the surrogate, but this is not always the case. 41 Prospective 
gay dads could also choose to use the sperm of a third-party donor 
to inseminate the carrier. Although traditional surrogacy allows a 
gay couple to choose one partner to be genetically related to the 
child, the gay couple can also choose that neither of them be ge-
netically related to the child. In contrast, the egg donor and the 
surrogate in traditionally surrogacy are the same woman, so the 
surrogate will always be genetically related to the child she gives 
birth to. · 
In traditional surrogacy, the surrogate and the intended par-
ents typically enter into an agreement called a surrogacy con-
tract.42 In uncontested cases, once the child is born, the surrogate 
terminates her parental rights and the intended parents, the gay 
dads, become the child's legal parents.43 In contested cases, an is-
sue appears if the surrogate decides to retain parental rights of 
35. See id. 
36. Id. (citing ARONS, supra note 34, at 6). 
37. Id. 
38. See id. 
39. Id. 
40. Traditional Surrogacy: A Summary of the Traditional Surrogacy Process, ALL 
ABOUT SURROGACY, http://www.allaboutsurrogacy.com/traditionalsurrogacy.htm (last vis-
ited Apr. 14, 2014). 
41. See Dana, supra note 15, at 360-61. 
42. Weldon E. Havins & James J. Dalessio, Reproductive Surrogacy at the Millenni-
um: Proposed Model Legislation Regulating "Non-Traditional" Gestational Surrogacy Con-
tracts, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 673, 675 (2000). 
43. Dana, supra note 15, at 361. 
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the child that she gave birth to and is genetically linked.44 Tradi-
tional surrogacy agreements are typically not well received in 
common law courts. 45 
Many ethical and legal debates arise in traditional surrogacy 
when the surrogate decides to retain parental rights. On the one 
hand, the woman is depriving the intended parents of their child, 
but on the other, many argue that surrogacy exploits the woman 
by treating her as an object.46 One solution to this ethical dilem-
ma is gestational surrogacy, where a third-party donor egg as 
well as a donor sperm is used. This form of surrogacy has become 
more socially acceptable, since the surrogate is not genetically re-
lated to the child.47 Gestational surrogacy helps to curb character-
ization of a woman as an object and a baby-seller. 48 It has also 
transformed the legal debate surrounding surrogacy.49 
Gestational surrogacy contracts are significantly different from 
traditional surrogacy contracts. Unlike traditional surrogacy, the 
surrogate in gestational surrogacy has no biological relation to 
the child she is carrying and giving birth to. 50 Gestational surro-
gacy complicates the determination of who the legal parents of 
the resulting child will be.51 In some circumstances where a third-
party egg and donor sperm are used, there can be up to five pro-
spective parents for the child. 52 These five potential parents are 
the intended mother, the intended father, the gestational mother, 
the egg donor, and the sperm donor. 53 For gay male couples, one of 
the intended fathers can donate sperm, but there must be a third-
party egg donor. 54 At most, only one of the intended fathers can be 
genetically related to the child.55 
44. Id. 
45. Havins & Dalessio, supra note 42, at 675. 
46. Dana, supra note 15, at 361 (citing Elizabeth S. Anderson, Is Women's Labor a 
Commodity, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 71, 76, 80 (1990)). 
47. Cf. id. at 362. 
48. Id. at 363. 
49. Id. at 362 (citing Debora L. Spar, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND 
POLITICS DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 78, 82 (2006)). 
50. Id. (citing Alexa E. King, Solomon Revisited: Assigning Parenthood in the Context 
of Collaborative Reproduction, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 329, 341 (1995)). 
51. Id. at 363. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
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Gay male couples attempting to create a family not only face 
obstacles in creating a child and establishing legal parentage, but 
they also face financial obstacles. In both gestational and tradi-
tional surrogacy contracts, the intended parents must provide for 
the surrogate's reasonable medical and ancillary expenses.56 
These costs can include payment to the surrogacy agency connect-
ing the parties, legal fees for the creation of the surrogacy con-
tract, and medical expenses.57 Despite the cost and complications, 
gestational surrogacy is becoming more common, with about 1400 
children born in 2008 through gestational surrogacy.58 Many of 
those children are the son or daughter of gay couples. 
Ill. ADOPTION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF PARENTAGE 
Parentage is the lawful recognition of a child's parents.59 Par-
entage can be established through genetic relation to the child, 
giving birth to the child, or adoption.60 Adoption is a viable option 
for a homosexual male couple looking to have a child. Generally 
adoption occurs in one of two ways: traditional adoption or sec-
ond-parent adoption.61 In traditional adoption, the identities of 
the birth parents and the adoptive parents are unknown to each 
other,62 and the couple or individual person adopts the child from 
foster care or another child placement source. 63 In contrast, in 
second-parent adoption one partner or spouse already has paren-
tal rights over the child, and the other spouse or partner adopts 
the child so that both partners have parental rights.64 Second-
parent adoption provides enormous benefits to the child, includ-
ing allowing the child to receive health benefits from both par-
ents, enabling parents to make important decisions regarding the 
56. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(5) (Cum. Supp. 2013); id.§ 20-162(B)(3) (Cum. Supp. 
2013). 
57. Id. § 20-160(B)(5) (Cum. Supp. 2013); Dana, supra note 15, at 363. 
58. Christopher White, Surrogates and Their Discontents, PUBLIC DISCOURSE (Aug. 
16, 2012), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/08/6137/. 
59. See PETER NASH SWISHER, ANTHONY MILLER, & HELENE S. SHAPO, FAMILY LAW: 
CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 285 (3d ed. 2012). 
60. VA. CODE ANN.§ 20-49.1 (2008). 
61. Family Formation, EQUALITY VIRGINIA, http://www.equalityvirginia.org/what-we-
do/protecting-families/adoption/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2014). 
62. Traditional Adoption, ADOPTION.COM, http://encyclopedia.adoption.com/entry/trad 
itional-adoption/359/1.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2014). 
63. Family Formation, supra note 61. 
64. Id. 
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child's health, and ensuring the child has another legally recog-
nized parent if one parent should die.65 
The Virginia Code does not explicitly prohibit same-sex couples 
from adopting a child, but Virginia Code section 63.2-1225 ex-
cludes same-sex couples from its enumeration of individuals or 
couples eligible to adopt a child.66 Section 63.2-1225 states that a 
"married couple or an unmarried individual shall be eligible to 
receive placement of a child for purposes of adoption."67 Although 
this section essentially precludes gay couples from adopting a 
child, the court must also consider the ''best interest of the child" 
in determining the appropriate home for adoption.68 Although the 
code does not directly enumerate factors for determining the "best 
interest of the child" in section 63.2-1225, the code does enumer-
ate these factors for purposes of determining custody or visitation 
arrangements in section 20-124.3.69 The ''best interest" standard 
established in section 20-124.3 can transfer to adoption.70 These 
factors include the age and physical and mental condition of the 
child, the age and physical and mental condition of each parent, 
the relationship between the parent and the child, the needs of 
the child, the role the parent has played in the past and will play 
in the future, the parent's ability to actively support the child, the 
parent's willingness to have an active relationship with the child, 
the child's preference, history of family abuse, and any other fac-
tors the court deems necessary.71 Nowhere in this section does the 
law require the judge to consider the sexual orientation of the 
parent. 
Second-parent adoption is one way for a gay couple to legally 
parent a child together, although currently it is not allowed in 
Virginia. As of March 2014, potential parents can petition for sec-
ond-parent adoption in fourteen states and the District of Colum-
65. Id. 
66. VA. CODE. ANN.§ 63.2-1225 (2012); see also FAMILY EQUALITY COUNCIL, ADOPTION 
AND FOSTER CARE, available at http://www.familyequality.org/_asset/Orq050/Adoption-and-
Foster-Care-FINAL.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2014). 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. VA. CODE ANN.§ 20.124.3 (2008). 
70. Id.; Alison M. Schmieder, Best Interest and Parental Presumptions: Bringing 
Same-Sex Custody Agreements Beyond Preclusion by the Federal Defense of Marriage Act, 
17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 293, 308-10 (2008); Family Formation, supra note 61. 
71. Id. 
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bia. 72 Seven states restrict second-parent adoption for same-sex 
couples.73 Virginia is not one of those states.74 The Virginia Code 
does not include a specific statutory provision for second-parent 
adoption, but second-parent adoption is not exclusively banned.75 
The Virginia Code also does not include a specific provision 
addressing the legal parentage of homosexual couples that use 
ART. However, the evolution of the law determining the parent-
age of a child whose parents are unmarried is important to the 
homosexual parentage discussion. Historically, there has been no 
common law duty of a father to support his child if he is not mar-
ried to the child's mother. 76 However, in 1952, Virginia passed leg-
islation requiring a father to support his child once paternity was 
proven, but the father had to admit to paternity under oath. 77 
This law was then revised to be less stringent in 1954, allowing 
an out-of-court admission as proof of paternity in writing under 
oath. 78 This statute was repealed in 1988 and then re-codified at 
the current Virginia Code section 20-49.1.79 Section 20-49.1 de-
fines legal parentage when a child's parents are unmarried. 80 It 
allows for the establishment of paternity when the biological fa-
ther and mother enter into a voluntary written agreement made 
under oath.81 In 1992, the statute was expanded to include pater-
nity revealed through genetic testing. 82 Section 20-49.1 does not 
72. Second Parent Adoption, FAMILY EQUALITY COUNCIL, http://www.familyequality. 
org/get_informed/equality_maps/second-parent_adoption_laws/ Qast visited Apr. 14, 2014). 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. See VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1200 (2012); Leslie M. Fenton & Ann Fenton, The 
Changing Landscape of Second-Parent Adoptions, AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION (Oct. 25, 
2011), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/childrights/content/articles/fall20 
11-changing-landscape-second-parent-adoptions.html; see also Family Formation, supra 
note 61. 
76. L.F. v. Breit, 736 S.E.2d 711, 717 (Va. 2013). 
77. Act of Apr. 3, 1952, ch. 584, 1952 Va. Acts 611 (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 20-61.1 (1958)). 
78. Act of Apr. 6, 1954, ch. 577, 1954 Va. Acts 350 (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 20-61.1 (1958)). 
79. Act of Apr. 20, 1988, ch. 866, 1988 Va. Acts 1025 (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. §§ 20-49.1 to -49.8 (1988)). 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Act of Mar. 30, 1992, ch. 516, 1992 Va. Acts 228 (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 20-49.1 (Cum. Supp. 1992)). 
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address the establishment of paternity by those who use assisted 
• 83 
conception. 
IV. THE VIRGINIA STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED 
CONCEPTION ACT 
In response to the increased use of ARTs, many states passed 
statutes regulating reproduction with the use of these advanced 
technologies, including Virginia, which adopted the Uniform Sta-
tus of Children of Assisted Conception Act ("US CA CA''). 84 In some 
aspects, Virginia's response to ARTs is more progressive than 
other states.85 For example, Virginia allows circuit courts to ap-
prove surrogacy contracts that statutorily comply with Virginia 
Code section 20-160,86 whereas Louisiana will not honor any re-
muneration for surrogacy services.87 However, in other aspects, 
Virginia's response to ARTs has been more conservative, especial-
ly with respect to the sexual orientation of the intended parents.88 
A. Adoption of Virginia Status of Children of Assisted Conception 
Act 
Virginia adopted the USCACA in 1991, which became the Vir-
ginia Status of Children of Assisted Conception statute, otherwise 
known as the Assisted Conception Act, 89 as a response to the 
83. Id. 
84. Rodgers-Miller, supra note 17, at 295; see DEP'T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS., LEGAL 
ISSUES CONCERNING AsSISTED REPRODUCTION 3 (2012) [hereinafter AsSISTED 
REPRODUCTION]. 
85. Rodgers-Miller, supra note 17, at 295. 
86. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160 (Cum. Supp. 2013). To approve a surrogacy agreement 
the following twelve requirements must be met: the court must have jurisdiction; a home 
study of the intended parents and the surrogate has been conducted and filed with the 
court; the surrogate and intended parents meet the standards of fitness that apply to 
adoptive parents; the contract was voluntarily entered it; there is a guarantee of payment 
of medical expenses; the surrogate has had one successful pregnancy; the intended parents 
and surrogate have undergone physical and psychological evaluations; the intended moth-
er is unable to carry the child for medical reasons; at least one of the parents is expected to 
be genetically related to the child; the surrogate's husband, if any, signs the agreement; 
the parties have received counseling regarding surrogacy; and the agreement is not sub-
stantially detrimental to any affected persons. Id. 
87. Rodgers-Miller, supra note 17, at 295. 
88. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (2008) (defining intended parents as "a man and a 
woman, married to each other"). 
89. H.D. 1973, 1991 Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Va. 1991); see AsSISTED 
REPRODUCTION, supra note 84, at 3. 
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Court of Appeals of Virginia decision in Welborn v. Doe.90 In Wel-
born a married couple used a third-party sperm donor to have a 
child, and the husband asserted parental rights over the child. 91 
The court held that the only way for the husband, who was not 
the biological father, to secure parental rights, was by divesting 
the rights of the third-party donor and enacting the parental 
rights of the husband through adoption.92 
The purpose of the USCACA, which Virginia adopted as its 
own, was to ensure that a child created by an ART had two legal 
parents when possible.93 The National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws drafted the USCACA in 1988.94 The 
committee's mission was "to effect the security and well-being of 
children born and living in our midst as a result of assisted con-
ception," which included the "use of such limited and monitored 
surrogacy procedures as might be necessary to accomplish" the 
committee's instructions.95 Under the provisions of the USCACA, 
the "intended parents" in a surrogacy agreement are restricted to 
"a man and woman, married to each other."96 This requirement 
reflects the committee's goal of protecting the interests of the 
child by providing the child with two legal parents. However, this 
provision harms unmarried couples, including homosexuals, who 
wish to procreate using ARTs.97 
The statutory language of the Assisted Conception Act effectu-
ates the purpose of ensuring a child has two legal parents, but 
discriminately limits these two parents to a man and woman who 
are married. The Assisted Conception Act begins with a list of 
definitions, 98 and the definition that stands as an obstacle to gay 
90. L.F. v. Breit, 285 Va. at 175, 736 S.E.2d at 717 (citing Welborn v. Doe, 10 Va. App. 
631, 394 S.E. 2d 732 (1990)). 
91. Id. at 733. 
92. Id. 
93. Robert C. Robinson & Paul M. Kurtz, Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Con-
ception Act: A View From the Drafting Committee, 13 NOVA L. REV. 491, 493 (1989); see 
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 7 (2002), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/ 
parentage/upa_final_2002.pdf. 
94. Robinson & Kurtz, supra note 93, at 491. 
95. Id. at 492. 
96. Id. at 490 (quoting UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF AsSISTED CONCEPTION ACT, 9B 
U.L.A. § 1 (Supp. 1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
97. Id. at 496. 
98. "Assisted conception" is defined as "a pregnancy resulting from any intervening 
medical technology, whether in vivo or in vitro, which completely or partially replaces sex-
ual intercourse as the means of conception." VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (2008). Medical tech-
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couples who wish to become parents through ARTs is the defini-
tion of "intended parents."99 Virginia Code section 20-156 defines 
"intended parents" through assisted conception as: 
[A] man and a woman, married to each other, who enter into an 
agreement with a surrogate under the terms of which they will be 
the parents of any child born to the surrogate through assisted con-
ception regardless of the genetic relationships between the intended 
parents, the surrogate, and the child. 100 
Virginia Code section 20-160 allows circuit courts to approve sur-
rogacy contracts that comply with a list of qualifications, includ-
ing a surrogacy contract signed by the "intended parents," the 
surrogate, and her husband.101 This section, read in connection 
with the definitions section, effectively prevents gay couples from 
forming a valid surrogacy contract under the statute. Section 20-
160 also requires the intended parents, the surrogate, and her 
husband to fulfill the "standards of fitness applicable to adoptive 
parents" and requires the surrogate be married with at least one 
living child.102 The statute further requires the intended parents, 
the surrogate, and her husband to undergo physical and psycho-
logical evaluations before the surrogacy contract can be ap-
proved.103 Additionally, the statute indicates that "[a]t least one of 
the intended parents is expected to be the genetic parent of any 
child resulting from the agreement."104 Section 20-160 then lists a 
number of requirements for the court to find in order to approve a 
surrogacy contract, and section 20-162 provides the circuit courts 
with guidance as to approval of contracts that do not necessarily 
meet all of those requirements.105 
The Virginia Code offers guidelines for how courts should treat 
surrogacy contracts not approved by the courts in sections 20-162 
and 20-158. Section 20-162 allows the surrogate to finalize the 
nologies the state considers to be "assisted conception" include "artificial insemination by 
donor, cryopreservation of gametes and embryos, in vitro fertilization, uterine embryo lav-
age, embryo transfer, gamete intrafallopian tube transfer, and low tubal ovum transfer." 
Id. Additionally, the statute restricts the definition of "compensation" to medical and an-
cillary expenses and requires the surrogate to wait three days to release her parental 
rights. Id.; see id.§ 20-162(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
99. Id.§ 20-156 (2008). 
100. Id. 
101. Id.§ 20-160(A) (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
102. Id.§ 20-160(B) (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
103. Id.§ 20-160(B)(7) (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
104. Id.§ 20-160(B)(9) (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
105. Id.§§ 20-160, -162 (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
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surrogacy contract if one of the intended parents is genetically re-
lated to the child by delivering the child to the intended parents 
and signing a consent form, or alternatively allows the surrogate 
to break the surrogacy contract by retaining her parental rights if 
she is genetically related to the child. 106 Under section 20-158(E), 
in a non-approved surrogacy contract, the genetic father of a 
child, often a gay man who donates his sperm, is precluded from 
any parental rights if the surrogate is married and decides to re-
tain her parental rights. 107 Thus, in a non-approved surrogacy 
contract, if the surrogate is married, her husband is part of the 
contract, the surrogate is genetically related to the child, and the 
surrogate decides to retain her parental rights to the child, the 
intended parents, often the prospective gay dads, no longer have 
any parental rights over the child. 108 The surrogate and her hus-
band in this circumstance would be considered the parents of the 
child. 109 Sections 20-162 and 20-158 thus allow the circuit court to 
deny a homosexual male his parental rights as result of these ex-
plicit provisions. no 
B. Parentage on Birth Certificates 
Virginia Code section 32.1-261 defines the requirements for a 
new birth certificate after adoption or proof of paternity. m The is-
suance of a new birth certificate after surrogacy or adoption is 
limited based on marital status.n2 Section 32.1-261 states that 
birth certificates for children born through surrogacy shall be is-
sued in compliance with sections 20-160 and 20-158, which deny 
homosexuals parental rights. "3 
Virginia is required to issue a new birth certificate listing both 
of the partners as parents only if a state or foreign country has 
certified a decree of adoption that includes the same-sex couple as 
106. Id.§ 20-162(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2013); see id. § 20-158(D) (2008). 
107. Id.§ 20-158(E)(2) (2008). 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Rodgers-Miller, supra note 17, at 297. 
111. VA. CODE ANN.§ 32.1-261 (2011). 
112. Id. But cf. Davenport v. Little-Bowser, 611 S.E.2d 366, 371 (Va. 2005) ("(T]here is 
nothing in the statutory scheme that precludes recognition of same-sex couples as 'adop-
tive parents."'). 
113. VA. CODE ANN.§ 20-158 (2008); id.§ 20-160 (Cum. Supp. 2013); VA. CODE ANN.§ 
32.1-261 (2011). 
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parents. 114 Virginia requires that the State Registrar establish a 
new birth certificate for those born out of state if an adoption re-
port from any state or foreign country or a certified decree of 
adoption is supplied. 115 This provision allows homosexual couples 
to be legal parents of a child together if they had a second-parent 
adoption in another state and then moved to Virginia and re-
quested a new birth certificate for their child. Under section 32.1-
261, Virginia must then recognize that adoption on the new birth 
certificate. 116 
A new birth certificate can also be issued if there is evidence, 
as may be required by the Office of Vital Records, proving that 
paternity has been legitimated or that the Commonwealth has 
proven paternity of that person by final order. 117 This provision al-
lows for a gay man who is biologically related to a child to be 
placed on the birth certificate. Finally, the statute requires that, 
"[a] surrogate consent and report form as authorized by § 20-
162 .... contain[s] sufficient information to identify the original 
certificate of birth and to establish a new certificate of birth in 
the names of the intended parents."118 This provision allows for 
married couples or single parents to be placed on the birth certifi-
cate, but not gay couples, since a court cannot approve their sur-
rogacy contracts under sections 20-160 and 20-162. 119 
C. The Assisted Conception Act and Homosexual Couples 
Same-sex couples do not fit within the confines of the Assisted 
Conception Act as parents. 120 Both Virginia Code sections 20-160 
and 20-162 require that the intended parents are a party to the 
surrogacy contract, and section 20-156 requires that these in-
tended parents be "a man and a woman, married to each other."121 
These provisions allow a court to approve a surrogacy contract 
based on marital status, preventing homosexual couples from en-
114. Id. § 32.1-261 (2011); see Davenport, 611 S.E.2d at 371, 372. 
115. VA. CODE ANN.§ 32.1-26.1 (2011). 
116. See id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. Id.§§ 20-160, -162 (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
120. Id. § 20-156 (2008). 
121. Id.; id.§§ 20-160, -162 (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
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forcing a surrogacy contact. 122 In effect, these provisions of the As-
sisted Conception Act affect homosexual couples, who cannot 
marry in Virginia, 123 by deeming them per se unfit parents. 124 
Although the Assisted Conception Act discussed above only ap-
plies to married intended parents, there is no case law or statute 
that prohibits a single man from entering into an unapproved 
surrogacy agreement. Thus, either one of the partners of a homo-
sexual couple can enter into a surrogacy contract as a single man 
in order to have a child. 125 If the intended father is genetically re-
lated to the child through the use of his sperm, then his name can 
be effortlessly placed on the child's birth certificate, as long as the 
surrogate is not married. 126 If the surrogate is married, then an 
Order of Parentage needs to be obtained, in which a DNA test es-
tablishes that the intended father is the biological father and the 
surrogate's husband is not. 121 If the intended father is, in fact, the 
biological father, then his name is placed on the child's birth cer-
tificate.128 Getting the biological father's name on the birth certifi-
cate is the easy part. 
In Virginia, getting the surrogate off the birth certificate as the 
mother while adding another a homosexual partner to the birth 
certificate is where the trouble begins. 129 Single-parent adoption 
allows the surrogate to be taken off the birth certificate if the in-
tended father was not already named on the original birth certifi-
cate.130 Also, if the surrogate is not genetically related to the child, 
an Order of Non-Parentage can remove the surrogate from the 
birth certificate.131 
122. See L.F. v. Breit, 736 S.E.2d 711, 717, 721 (Va. 2013). 
123. VA. CONST. art. 1, § 15-A. 
124. Rodgers-Miller, supra note 17, at 297 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 
446-47 (1972)). 
125. Assisted Reproductive Technology Options for Same-Sex Parents in Virginia, 
QUINN LA w CENTERS, http://www.quinnlawcenters.com/law-centers/adoption-and-surrog 
acy/reproduction/same-sex-options (last visited Apr. 14, 2014) [hereinafter ARTs for Same-
Sex Parents]. 
126. VA. CODE ANN.§ 32.1-261(2) (2011). 
127. Id.§§ 20-49.1, -49.8 (2008). 
128. Id.§ 20-49.8(C) (2008); id.§ 32.1-269 (2008). 
129. ARTs for Same-Sex Parents, supra note 125. 
130. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1201 (2012); Assisted Reproductive Technology Options for 
Single Parents in Virginia, QUINN LAW CENTERS, http://www.quinnlawcenters.com/law-
centers/adoption-and-surrogacy/reproduction/single-parent-optional (last visited Apr. 14, 
2014) [hereinafter ARTs for Single Parents]. 
131. ARTs for Single Parents, supra note 130. See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 
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A court can enter an Order of Non-Parentage after DNA testing 
establishing that the gestational carrier, a surrogate who carries 
a child from both a donated egg and sperm, is not the genetic par-
ent of a child. 132 This order terminates any claim by the surrogate 
for parental rights. 133 Failure to enter an Order of Non-Parentage 
would be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 
1, section 1 of the Virginia Constitution.134 If a man can use DNA 
testing to get relief from parental rights under the Virginia Code, 
then so should a woman. 135 Although this order is necessary to 
protect a surrogate's constitutional right, as of 2012, a Non-
Parentage Order in Virginia has not been successfully executed.136 
Even if the surrogate is removed from the birth certificate, a 
gay couple cannot, under Virginia law, add the non-biologically 
related parent to the birth certificate because the couple is not 
married and there is no second-parent adoption in Virginia. 137 The 
best outcome available in Virginia is that the same-sex couple can 
request a Joint Custody and Co-Guardianship Order by a court, 
but entry of this order is at the court's discretion and it still does 
not establish both gay dads as parents.138 Additionally, Virginia 
does not allow second-parent adoptions for any couple-gay or 
straight. 139 For the second parent to be added to the birth certifi-
cate, the family must move to another state that allows second-
parent adoption. 140 Then the second parent, gay or straight, can be 
added to a birth certificate after the couple moves back to Virgin-
ia, because the Full Faith and Credit Clause forces the Depart-
ment of Vital Records to abide by the other state's adoption or-
der.141 This is an option for homosexual couples to establish legal 
parentage, but it is not reasonable since it requires the couples to 
(2008); Colleen Quinn, The Single's & Same-Sex Couple's Guide to Building a Family in 
Virginia, GAYRVA.COM (July 30, 2012), http://www.gayrva.com/lifestyle/the-singles-same-
sex-couples-guide-to-building-a-family-in-virginia/. 
132. ARTs for Same-Sex Parents, supra note 125; Quinn, supra note 131. 
133. Quinn, supra note 131. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. Based on the author's research, there is no record of a successful Non-
Parentage order as of 2014. 
137. See ARTs for Same-Sex Parents, supra note 125. 
138. Id. 
139. Id.; Fenton & Fenton, supra note 75. 
140. ARTs for Same-Sex Parents, supra note 125. 
141. Id. 
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reside in another state for a period of time for the sole purpose of 
getting a second-parent adoption. Thus, homosexual male part-
ners cannot attain legal parentage of a child together in Virginia 
because they are not married and there is no second-parent adop-
tion. 
V. L.F. V. BREIT 
In January 2013, Virginia took a significant step towards rec-
ognizing the rights of unmarried parents who participate in as-
sisted conception with the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision in 
L.F. v. Breit. 142 In Breit, the court interpreted the Assisted Con-
ception Act, Virginia Code sections 20-156 through 20-164, con-
cluding that the right of a child to have two parents is more im-
portant than the state's goal in preserving and promoting 
traditional marriage. 143 
A. The Lower Court's Approach to Parentage of a Child Created 
Through ART 
In L.F. v. Breit, an unmarried father filed a petition for parent-
age of child he conceived with an unmarried mother through in 
vitro fertilization. 144 Beverley Mason and William D. Breit were in 
a long-term relationship and lived together several years as an 
unmarried couple when they decided to have a child together 
through in vitro fertilization using Breit's sperm and Mason's 
egg. 145 Prior to the child's birth, Mason and Breit filed a written 
custody and visitation agreement providing Breit with visitation 
rights and stating that those rights were in the best interest of 
the child.146 On July 13, 2009, Mason gave birth to a daughter, 
L.F. 147 Breit was present at the birth and named on the birth cer-
142. See generally 736 S.E.2d 711 (Va. 2013). 
143. Id. at 722; Andrew Vorzimier, Unmarried Sperm Provider Has Constitutional 
Right to Assert Parental Rights, THE SPIN DOCTOR (Jan. 14, 2013, 10:20 AM), http://www. 
eggdonor.com/blog/2013/01/14/unmarried-sperm-provider-constitutional-assert-parental-
rights/. 
144. Breit, 736 S.E.2d at 715. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. A written custody agreement, such as the one Breit and Mason entered into, is 
the same as what attorneys in Virginia are recommending to gay couples as their best out-
come for joint parental rights in the state. See Assisted Reproductive Technology Options, 
supra note 125. 
147. Breit, 736 S.E.2d at 715. 
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tificate as the father. 148 Breit and Mason named the child after 
Mason's paternal grandmother and Breit's maternal grandmoth-
er, and the couple hyphenated the child's last name as a combina-
tion of both their surnames.149 
After the child's birth, the couple entered a jointly executed 
"Acknowledgment of Paternity'' agreement, which stated that 
Breit was the legal and biological father of the child. 150 Additional-
ly, the couple mailed birth announcements together, naming both 
as parents to the child. 151 They lived together as a family for the 
next four months. 152 The couple then separated and Breit paid 
child support to Mason and maintained the child's health insur-
ance.153 Breit also established a relationship with the child by vis-
iting her on weekends and holidays.154 
In August 2010, Mason terminated all contact between Breit 
and the child. 155 In response, Breit filed a petition for custody and 
visitation in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court 
for the City of Virginia Beach and Mason responded with a mo-
tion to dismiss. 156 The court dismissed Breit's petition without 
prejudice. 157 Breit then filed a petition to determine parentage 
and establish custody and visitation in the Circuit Court for the 
City of Virginia Beach under Virginia Code section 20-49.2.158 
Breit filed a motion for summary judgment, in which he argued 
that the written Acknowledgment of Paternity that he and Mason 
agreed to under Virginia Code section 20-49.l(B)(2) was binding 
in establishing his parental rights of the child. 159 The court denied 
his motion for summary judgment and dismissed by nonsuit the 
remainder of his petition seeking custody and visitation. 160 Breit 
appealed. 161 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's deci-
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 715-16. 
159. Id. at 716. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
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sion. 162 The court of appeals held that a sperm donor is not barred 
from filing a parentage action to establish paternity of a child of 
assisted conception when the donor donated for the purpose of 
having a child with the mother and the mother entered into the 
Acknowledgment of Paternity voluntarily. 163 
An explanation of the court's reasoning requires a brief over-
view of Virginia Code sections 20-49. l(B)(2) and 20-158(A)(3). 
Section 20-158(A)(3) states that a sperm donor cannot be the par-
ent of child conceived through assisted conception, unless the do-
nor is the husband of the gestational mother. 164 Section 20-
49.l(B)(2) states that a parent and child relationship between a 
child and a man can be established in a written Acknowledgment 
of Paternity agreement between the mother and father. 165 The 
court of appeals "harmonized" section 20-49. l(B)(2) and the writ-
ten "Acknowledgment of Paternity" agreement entered into by 
the couple, with section 20-158(A)(3). 166 The court noted that this 
result was necessary to ensure consistency with the "the intent of 
the legislature to ensure that all children born in the Common-
wealth have a known legal mother and legal father." 167 The court 
concluded that it would be ridiculous to preclude a father from es-
tablishing legal parentage of a child conceived by assisted concep-
tion just because he was considered a "donor."168 
Mason appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia, arguing that 
the court of appeals erred in "harmonizing" these two Virginia 
Code sections. 169 Mason also argued that the Acknowledgment of 
Paternity entered into by the couple was void and that Breit 
lacked standing for asserting parentage. 110 Breit argued that Vir-
ginia Code sections 20-158(A)(3) and 32.l-257(D) are unconstitu-
tional because they violate Breit's protected "liberty rights of 
1 t t . d d ,,111 equa pro ec 10n an ue process. 
162. Id. (citing Breit v. Mason, 718 S.E.2d 482, 489 (Va. Ct. App. 2011)). 
163. Id. (quoting Mason, 718 S.E.2d at 489). 
164. VA. CODE ANN.§ 20·158(A)(3) (2008). 
165. Id. § 20·49.l (2008). 
166. Breit, 736 S.E.2d at 716 (citing Mason, 718 S.E.2d at 489). 
167. Id. 
168. Id. (citing Mason, 718 S.E.2d at 489). 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
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B. The Supreme Court of Virginia's Opinion 
The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed with Mason's argu-
ment that Breit had no parental rights because Breit was never 
married to Mason and the child was conceived through assisted 
conception. The court held that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects the unmarried father's funda-
mental right to the care, custody, and control of his child, despite 
his marital status. 172 The court emphasized that Breit was an in-
volved and interested parent who voluntarily executed an Ac-
knowledgment of Paternity with the child's mother.173 
1. The Virginia Assisted Conception Act 
The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected Mason's argument that 
the Assisted Conception Act be interpreted under its plain mean-
ing. Virginia Code section 20-164 states, "A child whose status as 
a child is declared or negated by [chapter 9] is the child only of 
his parent or parents as determined under this chapter ... and, 
when applicable, ... § 20-49.1 et seq .... for all purposes .... "174 
The court found that Mason's argument neglected this provision 
of the statute, and since section 20-164 explicitly references sec-
tion 20-49.1, the two sections must be read in "harmony'' with one 
another.175 Section 20-49.1 provides guidelines for how a parent-
child relationship may be established between a child and a man. 
The section allows a man to establish parentage over a child if 
there is a "voluntary written statement of the father and mother 
made under oath acknowledging paternity."176 Mason and Breit 
entered into one of these agreements after the child's birth. 177 
The court also rejected Mason's argument that, despite a men-
tion of Virginia Code section 20-49.1 in the Assisted Conception 
Act, the written agreement is null and void under the plain mean-
ing of section 20-49.1178 Mason claimed that section 20-49.1 is only 
applicable to existing parent-child relationships, not to the estab-
172. Id. at 721. 
173. Id. at 721-22. 
174. Id. at 718 (quoting VA. CODE ANN.§ 20-164 (Cum. Supp. 2013)). 
175. Id. at 718, 720. 
176. VA. CODE ANN.§ 20-49.l(B) (2008). 
177. Breit, 736 S.E.2d at 715. 
178. Id. at 718. 
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lishment of new parentage rights. 179 The court disagreed, conclud-
ing that the statute expressly allows for parentage rights to be in-
itially established with a written agreement under section 20-
49 .1.180 
Mason also argued that Breit should be denied parental rights 
despite the Acknowledgment of Paternity entered into under sec-
tion 20-49.1 because unmarried sperm donors cannot establish 
parental rights under section 20-158(A)(3). 181 The court harmo-
nized sections 20-158(A)(3) and 20-49.l(B) because section 20-
49.1 is referenced in the Assisted Conception Act and section 20-
158(A)(3) is a part of that act. 182 The court noted that the two 
statutes must be read together so as to avoid conflict since they 
address the same subject. 183 The court determined that sections 
20-49.l(B)(l) and 20-158(A)(3) conflict, because under section 20-
49.l(B)(l), a gestational mother could force parental responsibili-
ties on a sperm donor, or under section 20-49.l(B)(l) a sperm do-
nor, could establish parental rights above the mother's objection, 
which would go against the intent of the statute. 184 Thus, the 
court concluded that the sperm donor, aided only by the results of 
genetic testing, may not establish parentage. 185 However, the use 
of Virginia Code section 20-49. l(B)(2), as with the voluntary 
agreement used by the couple in this case, does not cause a con-
flict with Virginia Code section 20-158(A)(3). 186 
The court stated that although the Assisted Conception Act 
was written with married couples in mind, its purpose is to pro-
tect cohesive family units from third-party donors' potential in-
trusion.187 Breit is not the third-party intruder that the Act was 
meant to exclude, because Breit was the person whom Mason 
originally intended to be the child's father, she treated Breit as 
the child's father for a length of time, and she voluntarily 
acknowledged Breit as the legal father in the Acknowledgment of 
179. Id. 
180. Id. 
181. See id. at 719. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. at 720. 
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Paternity. 188 Breit also had a relationship with the child, and pro-
vided for her financially, until Mason cut him out of the child's 
life.189 The court determined that Mason, Breit, and the child were 
a "family unit" protected by the statute. 190 Thus, the court applied 
Virginia Code section 20-49. l(B)(2). 191 
2. Equal Protection and Due Process 
The court next addressed Breit's argument regarding a viola-
tion of the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The court held that the Assisted 
Conception Act does not violate the Equal Protection Clause but, 
if not harmonized with a statute that allows an unmarried father 
parentage rights, would violate the Due Process Clause. 192 Breit 
argued, and the court agreed, that if the Assisted Conception Act 
was applied as Mason wished, without being in harmony with 
Virginia Code section 20-49.1, the Act would have violated his 
constitutionally protected right to make decisions concerning the 
"care, custody, and control of his child."193 
The parent-child relationship is protected under the Due Pro-
cess Clause. 194 Both married and unmarried fathers enjoy this 
right by showing "a full commitment to the responsibilities of 
parenthood by coming forward to participate in the rearing of his 
child, his interest in personal contact with his child."195 Thus, 
since Breit showed a commitment to raising and having a rela-
tionship with the child, the court held that Breit had the funda-
mental right to make decisions concerning the child's "care, cus-
tody and control, despite his status as an unmarried donor."196 
The court stated that, "[s]imply put, there is no compelling reason 
why a responsible, involved, unmarried, biological parent should 
never be allowed to establish legal parentage of her or his child 
188. Id. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. at 721-22. 
193. Id. at 721. 
194. Id. at 721 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Wyatt v. McDermott, 
725 S.E.2d 555, 558 (Va. 2012); Copeland v. Todd, 715 S.E.2d 11, 19 (Va. 2011)). 
195. Id. (quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983)). 
196. Id. at 722. 
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born as a result of assisted conception."197 The court concluded 
that "[d]ue process requires that unmarried parents such as 
Breit, who have demonstrated a full commitment to the responsi-
bilities of parenthood, be allowed to enter into voluntary agree-
ments regarding the custody and care of their children."198 The 
court stated that 
it is incumbent on courts to see that the best interests of a child pre-
vail, particularly when one parent intends to deprive the child of a 
relationship with the other parent. "The preservation of the family, 
and in particular the parent-child relationship, is an imfgortant goal 
for not only the parents but also government itself .... "1 9 
The court also noted that preventing Breit's name from appear-
ing on the birth certificate violated the Due Process Clause.200 The 
court noted that the purpose of the birth certificate is to show an 
intended parent-child relationship and under Virginia Code sec-
tion 32.1-257(D), Breit was entitled to have his name listed on the 
child's birth certificate.201 
In conclusion, the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the court 
of appeals' decision that Breit was entitled to parental rights over 
the child, despite the fact that Breit was not married to the 
child's mother. 202 In doing so, the court took a big step in family 
law by putting the value of a child having two parents above the 
state's motive in promoting and preserving traditional marriage. 
In response to L.F. v. Breit, the Virginia General Assembly codi-
fied the opinion in Virginia Code section 1-240.1, the Rights of 
Parents Act.203 Section 1-240.1 states, "A parent has a fundamen-
tal right to make decisions concerning the upbringing, education, 
and care of the parent's child."204 
197. Id. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. at 723 (quoting Weaver v. Roanoke Dep't of Human Res., 265 S.E.2d 692, 695 
(Va. 1980)). 
200. Id. at 723-24 . 
201. Id. at 724. 
202. Id. 
203. VA. CODE ANN. § 1-240.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013) ("'That it is the expressed intent of 
the General Assembly that this act codify the opinion of the Supreme Court of Virginia in 
L.F. v. Breit, issued on January 10, 2013, as it relates to parental rights."'). 
204. Id. 
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VI. APPLICATION OF L.F. V. BREIT TO GAY COUPLES 
The decision in L.F. v. Breit regarding unmarried parents' pa-
rental rights and the subsequent Rights of Parents Act should 
open the door not only to unmarried heterosexual parents, but al-
so to homosexual parents who seek to have a child through as-
sisted conception. Both parents should be allowed to enter into 
binding surrogacy agreements and both parent's names should be 
allowed to be placed on birth certificates, granting them parental 
rights. The Due Process Clause should require that a gay man, 
similar to the father in Breit, who is unmarried but has demon-
strated a full commitment to parenthood, be allowed to enter into 
voluntary agreements regarding the custody and care of his chil-
dren, even if he is not biologically related to the child. 205 
A The Parent-Child Relationship Is a Fundamental Right for 
Parents and Children Regardless of Biological Connection 
A gay male parent who has demonstrated a commitment to the 
responsibilities of raising a child should have the protection of the 
Due Process Clause in his relationship with his child. As the Breit 
court stated, "[t]he relationship between a parent and child is a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."206 The United States Su-
preme Court has recognized that parental rights do not arise sole-
ly from the biological link between the child and parent. 201 In-
stead, "[w]hen an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment 
to the responsibilities of parenthood by coming forward to partici-
pate in the rearing of his child, his interest in personal contact 
with his child acquires substantial protection under the Due Pro-
cess Clause."208 
Many states, such as Wisconsin and New Jersey, have recog-
nized third parties, who have neither adopted nor are biologically 
related to the child, as legal parents under a psychological parent 
205. Cf. Breit, 736 S.E.2d at 722 (ruling that due process requires that unmarried par-
ents who demonstrate a commitment to parenthood be allowed to enter into voluntary cus-
tody agreements). 
206. Id. at 721 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Wyatt v. McDermott, 
725 S.E.2d 555, 558 (Va. 2012)). 
207. Id. (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983)). 
208. Id. (quoting Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261). 
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standard.209 In V.C. u. M.J.B., for example, the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey set a standard that allows "all persons who have will-
ingly, and with the approval of the legal parent, undertaken the 
duties of a parent to a child not related by blood or adoption" to 
have parental rights. 210 The court adopted the de facto parenting 
test created in the Wisconsin Supreme Court case Holtzman u. 
Knott. 211 This test established four necessary elements for de facto 
parenting: (1) the legal parent consented to the parent-like rela-
tionship with the third party; (2) the third party and the child 
lived in the same household; (3) the petitioner assumed the re-
sponsibilities of a parent by taking care of the child by supporting 
the child's education and development and by providing financial 
support; and (4) the third party has had a relationship with the 
child long enough to have established a ''bonded, dependent rela-
tionship parental in nature."212 An individual parent who meets 
these elements and who has neither adopted nor is biologically re-
lated to the child can be granted similar parental rights to biolog-
ically related or adoptive parents.213 Granting parental rights 
through this de facto test allows the state to remain unbiased to-
wards those of various sexual orientations, while also preserving 
the state's interest in maintaining the family. 
The Supreme Court of Virginia determined that parental rights 
should apply to Breit as the unmarried father of the child because 
he had shown a "full commitment to the responsibilities of 
parenthood."214 By adopting this standard, the court acknowl-
edged that something beyond genetics is needed to establish par-
entage of a child born through ART. Virginia should take the 
court's decision a step further. Virginia should join other states 
such as New Jersey and Wisconsin and establish a psychological 
parent standard when determining parental rights. This stand-
ard should look at the responsibilities the parent is willing to 
take on and the relationship between the parent and the child, 
regardless of genetic connection.215 The court in Breit stated, "we 
209. See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 541-42 (N.J. 2000); Holtzman v. Knott (In 
re Custody of H.S.H.-K.), 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995). 
210. Id. (footnote omitted). 
211. Id. at 551 (citing Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 421). 
212. Id. (quoting Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 421). 
213. See Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 420-21, 436-37 (discussing parental rights for a 
non-biological parent in the context of visitation rights). 
214. L.F. v. Breit, 736 S.E.2d 711, 722 (Va. 2013). 
215. Cf. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 550-51 (N.J. 2000) (laying out standards to be-
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recognize that children also have a liberty interest in establishing 
relationships with their parents."216 If this is true, by not estab-
lishing a psychological parent standard or something similar, 
Virginia is denying many children, raised by gay dads, their liber-
ty interest in having a relationship with both of their parents. 
Restricting a child to one legal parent when, in fact, the child is 
being raised by two caring adults, clearly violates this liberty in-
terest. 
As the Supreme Court of Virginia applied this protection to a 
parent-child relationship under the Due Process Clause to Breit, 
so too should Virginia apply this protection to gay dads. Breit's 
commitment to parenthood as a biological father is no different 
from a non-biological father who has shown a "full commitment to 
the responsibilities of parenthood."211 The sexual orientations of 
Breit and a gay parent have no effect on their ability to commit to 
parenthood. Thus, like in Breit, the Due Process Clause should 
protect gay male fathers' fundamental right to make decisions 
concerning the "custody and care of their child" regardless of their 
genetic relation to their child.218 
B. Equal Protection for Parent-Child Relationship of Gay Fathers 
Post-Windsor 
The protection provided by the Due Process Clause for the par-
ent-child relationship of unmarried fathers should extend to gay 
fathers because granting the protection to an unmarried straight 
father who had a child through ARTs and not an unmarried gay 
man raising a child conceived by ARTs would be to withhold this 
right based on sexual orientation. 
Although equal protection jurisprudence does not prohibit the 
states from treating various classes and groups of people differ-
ently, those classifications must be reasonable.219 Even though the 
United States Supreme Court has not recognized sexual orienta-
come a psychological parent). 
216. Breit, 736 S.E.2d at 723 (citing Commonwealth ex rel. Gray v. Johnson, 376 S.E.2d 
787, 791 0fa. Ct. App. 1989)). 
217. Id. at 721. 
218. Id. at 722. 
219. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Vir-
ginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Rodgers-Miller, supra 
note 17, at 298. 
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tion as a suspect class, homosexuals have been the victims of hate 
crimes and have been publicly ostracized for decades, qualifying 
them as a politically unpopular group. 220 In United States u. 
Windsor, the Court held "[t]he Constitution's guarantee of equali-
ty 'must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire 
to harm a politically unpopular group cannot' justify disparate 
treatment of that group."221 To bar a father who is fully committed 
to raising his child created through assisted conception from due 
process protection of his parent-child relationship simply because 
of his sexual orientation would be to harm him based on his sexu-
al orientation. The Equal Protection Clause should allow gay fa-
thers of children conceived through ARTs the due process protec-
tion provided in Virginia Code section 1-240.1.222 
The Windsor Court additionally stated that responsibilities and 
rights enhance the dignity of people, and to deprive people of 
their rights and responsibilities unequally creates instability. 223 
As the Court wrote, the federal Defense of Marriage Act 
("DOMA") demeaned same-sex couples and humiliated the tens of 
thousands of children being raised by these couples in not recog-
nizing their legal marriages.224 "The law in question makes it even 
more difficult for the children to understand the integrity and 
closeness of their own family and its concord with other families 
in their community and in their daily lives."225 
This reasoning should be applied to parental rights as well. To 
bar children from having two legal parents even though they are 
being raised and cared for by two parents is a state-imposed form 
of humiliation and discrimination. Restricting children to only 
one legal parent also makes it more difficult for children to un-
derstand the integrity of the family. They may not understand 
why they are prevented from having two legal parents simply be-
cause their parents are homosexual, while other children with 
heterosexual parents are allowed two legal parents. Similar to 
220. See Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 61 (1st Cir. 2008) ("Romer nowhere suggested that 
the Court recognized [homosexuals as] a new suspect class."); Rodgers-Miller, supra note 
17, at 299-300. 
221. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. _, _, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (quoting 
U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). 
222. VA. CODE ANN.§ 20-156 (2008); id.§§ 20-160, -162 (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
223. Windsor, 570 U.S. at_, 133 S. Ct. at 2694. 
224. Id. at_, 133 S. Ct. at 2694. 
225. Id. at_, 133 S. Ct. at 2694. 
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DOMA creating second-tier marriages, the Assisted Conception 
Act creates second-tier families.226 To bar a child from two legal 
parents simply because of his or her parents' sexual orientation is 
discrimination and should be seen as causing humiliation for 
children being raised by these parents in the eyes of the state. 
In the recent case of Bostic v. Rainey, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that Virginia's 
laws banning same-sex marriage are unconstitutional.221 The 
court rejected the Commonwealth's argument that parenting is a 
legitimate reason for banning same-sex couples from marrying.228 
In defending Virginia's marriage laws, proponents argued that 
"responsible procreation" and "optimal childrearing'' are sufficient 
state interests to allow Virginia to prohibit same-sex couples from 
marrying.229 The Commonwealth contended that natural parents 
should also be the legal parents.230 In disagreeing with this argu-
ment the court stated: 
[T]he welfare of our children is a legitimate state interest. However, 
limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples fails to further this inter-
est. Instead, needlessly stigmatizing and humiliating children who 
are being raised by the loving couples targeted by Virginia's Mar-
riage Laws betrays that interest .... [T]housands of children being 
raised by same-sex couples, [are] needlessly deprived of the protec-
tion, the stability, the recognition and the legitimacy that marriage 
231 
conveys. 
The court noted that homosexual couples are just as capable of 
raising children as heterosexual couples, and to hold otherwise is 
"unconstitutional, hurtful and unfounded."232 The court further 
opined that, "state-sanctioned preference for one model of parent-
ing that uses two adults over another model of parenting that us-
es two adults is constitutionally infirm."233 
This rationale regarding parenting and marriage laws should 
apply to the Assisted Conception Act. Similar to limiting mar-
riage to only between a man and woman, narrowly defining in-
226. See id. at_, 133 S. Ct. at 2694. 
227. Bostic v. Rainey, No. 2:13cv395, 2014 WL 561978, at *23 (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2014). 
228. Id. at *17-18. 
229. Id. at *17 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
230. Id. at *18. 
231. Id. at *18. 
232. Id. at *18-19. 
233. Id. at *19. 
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tended parents in Virginia Code section 20-156 to only a married 
man and woman is unconstitutional because it essentially asserts 
that homosexual couples cannot be good parents.234 As the East-
ern District Court of Virginia stated, homosexual couples are just 
as capable of being good parents as heterosexual couples.235 Deny-
ing children the ability to have two legal parents under the As-
sisted Conception Act deprives them of the protection, stability, 
and legitimacy that having two legally-recognized parents pro-
vides.236 Children deserve to have the benefits and security of two 
legal parents and denying that benefit discriminates against 
these children based on the sexual orientation of their parents. If 
the state holds the welfare of children as an interest, then the 
state must remedy this humiliation and discrimination by allow-
ing children of gay couples to have two legal parents through sec-
ond-parent adoption or revision of the Assisted Conception Act. 
C. Surrogacy Agreements and Birth Certificates Should Be 
Constitutionally Protected 
In L.F. v. Breit, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that "[d]ue 
process requires that unmarried parents such as Breit, who have 
demonstrated a full commitment to the responsibilities of 
parenthood, be allowed to enter into voluntary agreements re-
garding the custody and care of their children."237 The court de-
termined that not allowing Breit to enter into a Virginia Code 
section 29-49.1 agreement and denying him parentage on the 
birth certificate merely because he is an unmarried sperm donor 
for a child conceived through ARTs violates his constitutionally 
protected right to a parent-child relationship.238 
This reasoning should also be applied to surrogacy agreements. 
By not allowing a homosexual male, especially one who is not ge-
netically related to a child conceived through ARTs, to enter into 
an approved surrogacy contract in Virginia because he cannot ful-
fill the definition of "intended parents" precludes him from a legal 
means of establishing parentage of his child should the surrogate 
decide to maintain her parental rights. This prohibition should 
234. VA. CODE ANN.§ 20-156 (2008). 
235. Bostic, 2014 WL 561978, at *18. 
236. Id. 
237. 736 S.E.2d 711, 722 (Va. 2013). 
238. Id. 
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not withstand constitutional scrutiny. An unmarried homosexual 
male who has demonstrated a full commitment to raising a child 
should be free to enter into an approved agreement with a surro-
. gate in order to retain his constitutionally protected parent-child 
relationship, and it should reflect a pure intent perspective. 
The intent test was established in Johnson v. Calvert, a Cali-
fornia case from 1993.239 In this case, the intent test was used to 
determine maternal parentage when, under state law, two wom-
en qualified to be the mother of one child. 240 Intent is determined 
by who was responsible for the initial fertilization of the embryo 
and who initially intended to raise the child. 241 It is also known as 
the ''but for" test-but for the intended mother's acted-on inten-
tion, the child would not be in existence. 242 This standard allows 
the truly intentional parents, regardless of gender, sexual orien-
tation, or marriage status, to gain parental rights. The intent test 
directly affects the parties' constitutional claims.243 Since gesta-
tional carriers or mere donors are not the ''but for" factor creating 
the child, they are barred from claims for parental rights under 
the Constitution.244 The intent test is an unambiguous and neu-
tral standard for establishing parentage that assures parties to 
surrogacy agreements that the intended outcome will be unde-
terred. 245 
By adopting the intent test as applied in Johnson, Virginia 
would eliminate many issues surrounding surrogacy agreements 
and parentage rights for gay couples. If the law defined parents of 
the child born by ARTs as the parties whose intent was the rea-
son the child was born, regardless of the parties' gender, marital 
status, or sexual orientation, then the surrogacy agreement 
would be protected under the constitution from outsider's claims 
for parental rights. 
Finally, the analysis regarding the father's right to appear on 
the birth certificate under the Fifth Amendment in L.F. v. Breit 
should also apply to any intended fathers under Virginia Code 
239. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993). 
240. Id. at 779; Dana, supra note 15, at 367. 
241. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782; Dana, supra note 15, at 367. 
242. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782; Dana, supra note 15, at 367. 
243. See Dana, supra note 15, at 368. 
244. Id. 
245. Id. (citations omitted). 
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section 32.l-257(D).246 Preventing an unmarried gay father from 
appearing on the birth certificate violates his constitutionally 
protected right to a parent-child relationship since parentage on a 
birth certificate shows intent of a parent-child relationship. 247 
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
The definition of "intended parents" in the Assisted Conception 
Act violates gay male couples' constitutionally protected right to a 
parent-child relationship. To remedy this constitutional violation, 
Virginia should amend the definition of "intended parents" in the 
Assisted Conception Act so that unmarried gay males may enter 
into approved surrogacy agreements in Virginia.248 The definition 
of "intended parents" in Virginia Code section 20-156 should be 
amended to simply reflect the intent of the parties, rather than 
marital status, genetic relationship to the child, or gender status 
in establishing parentage. The statute should state that "intend-
ed parents" are individuals whose intent is to create a child, and 
without whom no parent-child relationship would exist. This 
would overcome the constitutional violation of an unmarried 
male's right to make decisions concerning his child's interests, re-
gardless of his genetic relationship to the child, because he would 
now be able to enter into an approved surrogacy agreement with 
the protections those contracts provide in Virginia. 
Another potential solution is to allow second-parent adoption in 
Virginia. Senator Janet D. Howell sponsored Senate Bill 336, 
which would allow for a second-parent adoption. 249 This bill came 
before the Virginia General Assembly in January 2014.250 The bill 
states: 
[a] person other than the parent of a child may adopt a child if (i) ... 
the child had only one parent or the child is the result of surrogacy 
and the surrogate or carrier consents to the adoption, (ii) the petition 
does not seek to terminate the parental rights of the parent of the 
246. VA. CODE ANN.§ 32.l-257(D) (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
247. See L.F. v. Breit, 736 S.E.2d 711, 724 (Va. 2013). 
248. Rodgers-Miller, supra note 17, at 314. 
249. S. 336, Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Va. 2014); Bills to Allow Second Parent Adop-
tion Head to 2014 GA with Bi-Partisan Support, GAYRVA.COM (Jan. 10, 2014), http:// 
www.gayrva.com/news-viewslbills-to-allow-second-parent-adoption-head-to-2014-ga-with-
bi-partisan-support/ [hereinafter Bills to Allow Second Parent Adoption]. 
250. S. 336, Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Va. 2014); Bills to Allow Second Parent Adop-
tion, supra note 249. 
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child, and (iii) the parent of the child joins the petition for the pur-
. d" . 251 pose m icatmg consent. 
The purpose of this bill is to provide security to children of both 
straight and gay couples living in two-parent families with only 
one legal parent.252 This bill would create an option for a gay dad, 
who is not genetically related to his child, to gain parental rights 
alongside his partner.253 On January 24, 2014, the bill was dead-
locked in the Senate and thus killed during the 2014 legislative 
• 254 
session. 
If Virginia values a child's right to have two parents over its in-
terest in promoting traditional marriage, the Commonwealth 
must redefine the Assisted Conception Act or approve second-
parent adoption. Virginia should allow for a child to have two ful-
ly committed gay fathers rather than restricting a child to only 
1 1 255 one ega gay parent. 
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